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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Responilent,
-vs-

WALTER PARNELL HOSS,

Case No.
12545

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEl\lENT OF TI-IE NATURE
OF THE CASE
Appellant was tried in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, on a charge of
second degree murder.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty by a jury and was
sentenced for the term prescribed by law to the Utah
State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGI-IT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the decision of the lower
court be affirmed.
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STATEMEXT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees basically with the facts as stated
by appellant with the following additions.
The expert testimony of Dr. \Vilson was to the
effect that the victim had reeeiYed 23 injuries caused
by external force. (H. 120, 121). The table leg could
have caused the two injuries to the back of the head,
and the injury to the liver is consistent with jamming
the table leg into the ,·ictim's stomach. (H. 137). Appellant said it took about 15 minutes for the police to
arrive a ftcr he had called them. ( ll. 2()0). Dr. \V eston
testified that <lea th could not have occmred sooner than
3
before 7 :30 a.m. ( R. 320). \Vhen appellant
first talked to the police, he did not tell them the same
story that he later told them. ( H. 289). The court gave
instructions on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter
as well as on second degree murder. (R. 60).
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE EVIDENCE \VAS SUFFICIENT
TO SI-10\V THE l\11\LICl•: NECESSAHY FOR SECOND DEG-REE _MUR-

DER.

The procedure followed by Utah Courts in ruling
on a motion to dismiss for lack of evidence is described
in State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281 1 272 P.2d 195
(1954):
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" [ T] he trial court does not consider the
weight of the evidence or credibility of the witnesses, hut determines the naked legal proposition of law, whether there is any substantial
eYidence of the guilt of the accused, and all
reasonable inferences are to be taken in favor
of the state." Id. at 198.
In ruling on a motion for a new trial, a judge may deny
the motion if there is "evidence upon which reasonable
men might differ" as to the guilt of the accused. Id. at
198. Since the only element of the crime which is the
subject of this appeal is the issue of malice aforethought, the decision of the lower court must be upheld
if there is "any substantial evidence" to show malice
aforethought.
This court in State v. Trujillo, 117 Utah 237, 214
P .2d G2G ( 19.50), defined malice as not only the wish
to kill hut the wish "to do great bodily harm, or to do
an act knowing that its reasonable and natural consequences would be death or great bodily harm." Id. at
G33. :l\Ialice may be either express or implied. It is expresse<l when there is "manifested a deliberate intention
unlawfully to take the life" of a person. :Malice is implied when either there is "no considerable provocation"
or when the circumstances show an "abandoned and
malignant heart." Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-2 ( 1958).
Appellant contends that there was no evidence of
planned, or thought-out intent or design; however,
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this is not required. "Aforethought" docs not imply the
adoption of a plan of action hut is "giving thought beforehand to malicious feelings or desires." Id. at 633.
There is no requirement that the thought heforehand be
formed any particular
of time he fore the act is
done ...A malieious intent may be formed the instant the
criminal act is clone. A man may do a thing maliciously
from a moment's reflection as well as after pondering
over it for a month. State t'.
22 Utah 1H2, 61
P ..527 (l!lOO). All that is necessary is that the design
to act or to kill must be formc<l before the act. State v.
lUasato Karumai, 101 Utah .5H2, 126 P.2d 1047 (1942).
The ruling of the lower court must be upheld if
there is "any suhstantial evi<lcuce" to show that appellant gave thought heforehand, even if it were only a
moment heforehan<l, to his actions knowing that their
reasonable arul natural consequences would he death or
great bodily harm, or if there were no considerable
provocation, or if there were evidence of an abandoned
and malignant heart.
Appellant contends that the extent of the injuries
and the manner of infliction are not tleterminative as
to intent. llowever, courts have implied malice in circumstances similar to the present case from the extent
of the injuries and the manner of infliction. In
Breeding v. State, 151A.2d743 (l\Id. l!l.59), the court
found malice aforethought where the victim died from
manual strangulation, after a severe beating and
struggle. In Pierce v. State, 256 N.E.2d 557 (Ind.
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1970) , the court found that death by strangulation
supported a finding of premeditated malice.
There is substantial evidence to imply malice from
the circumstances of this case. The expert testimony
of Dr. \Vilson established that the victim had received
twenty-three injuries caused by external force. (R. 120,
121). The cause of death was a combination of loss of
blood due to a torn liver and asphyxiation due to the
compression of the bone and muscles of the neck. (R.
123). Strangulation by use of hands is consistent with
the findings of Dr. Wilson's external and internal postmortem examination. (R. 136). The table leg could
have caused the two injuries to the back of the head
and the injury to the liver is consistent with jamming
the table leg into the victim's stomach. (R. 137). The
appellant testified that he did in fact hit the victim
with the table leg. ( R. 259). All of these injuries and
causes of death are consistent with a struggle. (R. 136).
Looking at these facts in the light most favorable to
the State, there is substantial evidence to imply malice.
Even though repeated blows by the hands may not
ordinarily show implied malice, the Utah Supreme
Court has emphasized "that an assault without a weapon
may be attended with such circumstances of violence
and brutality that an intent to kill will be presumed."
State v. Jensen, 120 Utah 531, 236 P.2d 445, 447
( 1951). In the Jensen case, the defendant, a large man,
severely beat the victim, a smaller man, with his hands
resulting in the victim's death two hours later. The

court found that the issue of intent may well have been
submitted to the jury even if the defernlant had macle
no threat nor expression of his intention.
The evidence in the present case is sufficient to
establish the existf·nce of an abandoned and malignant
heart. Reasonable minds may conelude that a 220 pound
man who physically abused his !l5 pound wife by heating her with his hands, striking her on the head with a
table leg which could he a lethal weapon, and strangling
her with his hands evidences a brutal and savage attack. Thus, the evidenee supports a finding of implied
malice.
Appellant asserts that his actions were the result
of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion and that the
charge should be reduced to manslaughter. The court in
Yarber v. State, I7n N.E.2d 882 (Incl. 1962), found
it well-settled that the sudden heat of passion sufficient
to reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter,
must be accompanied by adequate pro\'ocation. The
Ptah law requires a finding of murder if "no considerable pronJcation appears." Utah Code Ann. § 7H-30-2
( H);33). Rensonahle minds may conclude that there was
no considerable provocation for the appellant to inflict
serious bodily injury on his wife because she would not
tell him where her fix kit was. Reasonable minds may
find it inconsistent that appellant woul<l consent to her
having another "date" and yet be in the heat of passion
when she took drugs since refraining from both activities was required for them to again receive custody of
their child. Looking at the facts in a light most favor-
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able to the state, there is substantial evidence from
which to believe that there was no considerable provocation to justify appellant's violent actions. The evidence supports a firtdi11g of implied malice.
Appellant contends that the jury could not believe
otherwise than that there was a sudden quarrel; however, there was substantial evidence to the effect that
a struggle of some duration had taken place. The jury
need not believe the appellant's account of the killing
if it finds e\'idence to the contrary. Reasonable minds
could question the reliability of appellant's testimony
when he stated that after his wife told him where the
fix kit was, he realized that she was hurt and ran down
stairs and called the police. ( R. 260). He said it took
about 1.5 minutes for the police to arrive. (R. 260). The
first officer arrived at 5:17 a.m. (R. 93). That would
place the time he allegedly realized she was hurt at
about 5 a.m. Expert testimony places the time of death
between 3 and 6 hours before 7 :30 a.m., the time when
rigor mortis was detected. Dr. Weston testified that
rleath could not have occurred sooner than three hours
before 7 :30 a.m., which would mean that death could
not have occurred later than 4 :30 a.m. (R. 320). Reasonable minds could conclude that from the above evidence and the testimony of .Mr. Gallegos, the time of
death was closer to I :30 a.m., the time at which Mr.
Gallegos, a sound sleeper, was awakened by the sound
of loud noises and voices coming from the appellant's
apartment. (R. 108).
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\Vhen appellant first talked to the police, he did
not tell them the same story that he later told them.
(R. 289). Appellant testified that the table leg was already broken off and was on the dresser when he picked
it up to use it on his wife. (R. 259). Officer Ledford
testified that appellant told him that he broke the leg
off the table just before he hit his wife with it. (R.
234). Since there was reason to question appellant's
version of what happenc<l, reasonable men looking at
the facts most f axorahle to the state could conclude that
there was no sudden quarrel, hut rather a prolonged
struggle, and therefore no justification would exist for
reducing the charge to manslaughter .
.

The refusal to grant appeJlant's motions did not
in any way prejudice his case. The jury was properly
instructed that the State had the burden of proof. The
court gave instructions on voluntary and involuntary
manslaughter, as well as on second degree murder. (R.
60). After careful consideration of the instructions, the
jury found from the evidence that there was malice.

POINT II
TI-IE PROBATIVE VALUE OF CERTAIN C 0 L 0 RED SLIDES OUT\VEIGHED ANY PREJUDICIAL NATURE THEY :MAY HA VE.
The trial court has discretion to weigh the probative value of colored slides against their possible inflam-
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atory nature. State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.2d
512 ( HW8). Ordinarily, that exercise of discretion will
not he disturbed unless manifest error be shown.

State v. Renzo, 21 Utah 2d 205, 443 P.2d 392, 399
( HW8).
Appellant contends that the seven slides should have
been excluded for four reasons. First, the slides were
gruesome. llowever, "evidence is not necessarily incompetent because it may be gruesome and practically every
state in the Union has so held." State v. Jackson, 22
Utah 2d 408, 454 P.2d 290, 291 (1969).
Second, appellant asserts that the slides were cumulatiYe of other oral testimony, especially that of Dr.
'Yilson. Hesponding to a similar contention in State v.
.T ackson, supra, the court said that the fallacy of this
reasoning is that "the oral testimony may be discounted
by the jury." 454 P.2d at 291. The applicable law is
set out in State v. Renzo, sztpra, as follows: "the photographs, though cumulative, served to corroborate the
doctor's testimony and were admissible for that purpose." 443 P.2d at 397. In the present case, the slides
were corroborative of other oral testimony.
Third, appellant argues that the colored slides had
no probative value because the key issue was intent and
intent cannot be established by the extent of the injuries. However, as established in Point I of Respondent's Brief, the nature and extent of the wounds
are important in establishing intent. This court in
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State t'.

106 Utah 116, 145 r.2d 1003, 1010

(1944), held:

"Even though the defendant did admit the killing, he did not admit the intent to kill and the
nature of the wounds may he material on that
point. The pictures showed the nature of the
wounds more clearly than the testimony of
witnesses could."
Finally, appellant contends that the number of
slides was excessive. llowever, it cam1ot he said that
seven slides taken from Jifferent views to corroborate
oral testimony describing 23 injuries are excessive. Perhaps more slides, rather than fewer, should have been
used.
Certainly, appellant cannot complain of the inflamatory nature of the slides when he himself created
the scene. In State 'l' • .loh11so11, 25 Utah 2d 46, 475 P.2d
543 ( 1970), J nstice Crockett said:

"There is some sort of paradox involved
where one commits a heinous act and then complains that the very sight of what he had done
is so revolting to the sensibilities of normal
people (the jurors) that it would so distort
their judgment that they could not fairly determine his guilt or innocence of crime." 475
P.2d at 546.
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The decision of the trial court to admit the seven
colored slides should be upheld because the probative
value of the slides in establishing intent outweighed
any possible prejudice to the appellant.

CONCLUSION
The record shows that there was substantial evidence to establish malice and that appellant was not
prejudiced in any manner by admitting the slides into
evidence. The decision of the lower court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney
General

DAVID R. IRVINE
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

